Functionalism in the language sciences basically claims that language is instrumental, i.e. that it fulfills certain functions for its user. But there is much confusion and little agreement about what the functionality of language involves. Yet, this is a matter of the uttermost importance for theory formation in the functionalist framework, since one's conception of language function will (or should) crucially determine the way one goes about in analyzing language structure and developing a grammar or, more generally, a model of human language processing and behavior. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to the clarification of how to understand the functions of language. I will first explicate the basic structure of the concept of function as such (1.). This provides the elements for making more precise the problem we are dealing with with respect to language (2.). Then I will discuss some of the most prominent proposals for function typologies in the literature (3.). On that basis, and through an analysis of the basic factors in communicative interaction, I will suggest a 'functional scheme' for human natural language (4.). Finally, I will discuss the relationship between communicative and other usages of language (5.).
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I. ON FUNCTIONS
Since a discussion of the functionality of language necessarily evolves around the concept of 'function' as such, a proper understanding of this notion seems indispensable.
In fact, as will appear below, some of the main discrepancies between views on language functionality in the Uterature are due to different usages of the notion. Therefore, in order to have a stable frame of reference, let's first briefly try to specify the structure of function specifications in scientific analyses of phenomena in general, before turning to a discussion of how statements on language functions relate to this.
It is sometimes claimed that "the word 'function' is highly ambiguous, and an exhaustive list of its many meanings would be very long" (Nagel 1961: 522 ).Yet, this might be a case of not seeing the wood for the trees. The fact that the term is used in several sciences to refer to quite different phenomena does not imply that it is ambiguous. It is IPrA Papers in Pragmatics 3, No. f (1989) , B8-128 an inherent property of lexical items that they have flexibility in usage. The real issue is whether there exists a regularity in what is referred to by the term. In fact, if we abstract away from the usage of the term in mathematics and physics2, it seems possible to grasp the main usages of the term in biology and the human sciences in terms of scheme (1).
(1) [8, -> Ar] -> [Ez -> A:] (E stands for an 'entity' (a unit or system), A for an 'activity'or 'property', and the arrows speci$ the dfuection of the dependency-relationship between the entities and activities involvedthe specific meaning of these symbols will become clear below.)
On the one hand, the term function can be used to state the existence of a relationship between two clusters of an entity and its activity or property as represented by the middle anow in scheme (1). This usage takes the form of a statement that the function of A, and/or E, is to enable E, to do A, or to preserve A, in E, (or something similar). Hence, this involves formulating a goal or role of A, and/or Er. Some exampless:
(2) The function of seeing is to detect enemies
(3) Respiration is a vital function oVfor humans Irt's call this notion of function 'role function '.{ On the other hand, the term function can also be used to refer to an activity or property inherent to some unit or system within a wider system, i.e. to the arrow as it occurs in a simple scheme of the type [E -> A] in scheme (1). This usage is illustrated in (a) and (5).
(4) The function of the eyes is seeing (5) The heart has the function to pump blood lrt's call this (with Greenberg 1958) 'organic function '. Though the structure of role functions and organic functions is different at first sight, they show a clear relationship. By stating organic functions one clearly implies that A is the 'task' of E within the system it is part of. That is, one suggests that A has a specific role to fulfil within the larger system, and thus that the cluster specified should be taken to be part of a more encompassing scheme of the type of (1). This is what Nagel (1979) calls the 'goal-supporting view ' The role of an entity/activity specified in a functional statement is obviously always supposed to be a positive one within a larger context. Thus, one would never say that 'the function of an axe is to split the heads of humans ' . For an axe is simply not intended for that activity. One might say that 'this axe has had the function to split a man's skull ', but only if the axe has been used with that intention. It always implies that the axe has had a positive contribution from the perspective of the one who used it, to allow him/her to split a man's skull.
Of course, role and organic functions can have various characteristics, depending on the features of the phenomena under consideration. For example, within the category of role functions one can distinguish between a formulation of relations between complexes of type [E -> A] which are located at different hierarchical levels (a relation between an entity/activity and the global system it belongs to), and which are located at the same hierarchical level (a relation between entities/activities within one global system Greenberg (1958) calls this 'internal function ') .6 Both in role functions and organic functions, one can distinguish between intentional and non-intentional functions, involving a conscious choice or action by a 'controlling' being or not. And, of course, it is often possible to specify several functions of one and the same entity or activity. Obviously, such modalities do not change the basic pattern expressed by a functional statement. They do play a role in the further analysis of the phenomena under consideration, though, and therefore it is important in specifying functional patterns to be clear about the exact composition and properties of the relations one is formulating. Of course, this is not always easy, as discussions of the functionality of language have shown.
WHAT IS I}WOLYED IN THE FUNCTIONALITY OF I.-A,NGUAGE?
The notion 'function' in the language sciences first of all occurs with respect to entities related to the linguistic system, to specify properties they have or things they do by means of which they play a role for the functioning of other entities. Thus, 'function' is used to refer to the pragmatic (information structural), semantic or syntactic status of constituents in an utterance which makes them fulfill some role for each other and/or contribute to the functionality of the utterance as a whole (as in 'the function of constituent X is subject '; cf. the notions syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic function in Dik 1978) . More generally, the term is used to indicate the role of some sub-structure within a larger utterance unit.
Thus, one can speak of the meaning distinguishing function of phonemes in minimal pairs, the function of words in constituents, 'function words', the function of utterances and para-9I graphs within a text, etc. This nearly always involves the specification of an 'organic function' of structural units, implying that through this function they contribute to the functioning of linguistic structures at higher levels, and, ultimately, of the linguistic system in general. They specify elements of the functional network organizing language and allowing it to perform its role in an even wider context. The notion also occurs specifying the role of (hypothetical) components or sub-structures of the cognitive system determining linguistic behavior, within this system as a whole. Thus, one can speak of the function (the role) of the lexicon in a grammar, of world knowledge in language understanding, etc.
Again, this involves aspects of the internal organization of language (albeit along a different dimension), suggesting that they are part of a functional network causing language as a whole to fulfill its role in a wider context. These 'functions' internal to the linguistic system are of no further concern in the present paper, however. What interests us here is the usage of the notion 'function' to refer to this ultimate question concerning language as a unit, viz. the activities and roles it performs for the organism using it as a behavioral system. This is the matter of the functionality of language as such. The problem involved has to be ;een within the general goal-directed nature of human behavior. A human is to a large degree a purposeful and even intentionally acting being. The things (s)he does normally make sense in the light of his/her own perspective on the contexts in which (s)he figures. This is not to say that (s)he cannot behave in senseless ways (in pathological cases, by mistake, or deliberately). But it only makes sense to talk about 'senseless behavior' against the background of the observation that normal behavior is meaningful, i.e. has a positive role for, or is directed toward the 'well-being' of the actor. This does not mean that every aspect of human performance is meaningful or goal-directed either. The snoring of a sleeping person, e.g., is no more a goal-directed act, or does no more contribute to the performance of a goal directed act, than the flapping of laundry in the wind or the whistling of a water-kettle on the stove. Neither is the smacking sound produced while chewing a goal-directed act (intentional smacking aside) or a positive contribution to the goal-directed process of food consumption. Nearly every purposeful act of the body produces 'noise', side-effects, and one has to carefully distinguish between things 'a human being does' and things 'proceeding from his/her body'.
In fact, the same distinction has to be made in domains other than the behavioral. Maybe language also causes side-effects (in the sense mentioned above). Though this matter has to be kept apart from the functions, since it may be important for a functional analysis of language, we will nevertheless have to pay attention to it.
ON THE LITERATI.JRE ON THE FIJNCTIONALITY OF Lq.NGUAGE
If one takes a look at the literature dealing with the functions of language, one is struck by the disparity and unclarity of the views presented. Proposals are sometimes wildly diverging, but motivation and/or argumentation is often lacking, and systematic comparison with alternatives is hardly ever found. This is quite an embarrassment, given the potentially crucial role of these matters for functionalist approaches to language. [rt's scrutinize some of the more prominent suggestions and see where they lead us at. (See also Nuyts 1e88.)
The cause for the differences seems to lie not only in mere contradiction between analyses of identical phenomena, but also in the fact that not all proposals concern the same phenomena. The analyses can be about different aspects of (6) (without there being an awareness of this: something like (6) is never made explicit in the literature), or even about phenomena which only indirectly relate to (6). In this respect, one can roughly distinguish three (albeit internally far from coherent) sets of proposals. Two of them main-
ly concern (at different levels of abstraction) the notion of communication, which is clearly relevant for the role function aspect of (6) (3.1), and the third one mainly concerns the organic function aspect of (6) (3.2).
COMMUI\-ICATION AND STIB.ASPECTS OF IT
No doubt the most frequent view is that the function of language is communication.
As Sapir (1931: 105) already stated, "Language is the communicative process par excellence in every known society", and this view is hardly ever contested (in most of the more complex proposals to be discussed below the functions are also situated within the 'language for communication' view.) Of course, this statement remains somewhat vague, since the notion of communication is ambiguous. There are at least two usages in the literature, viz. (i) a general one, referring to the process of interaction between individuals, and (ii) a specific one, referring to the process of interaction betrveen individuals by means of natural language. This ambiguity is interesting in so far that it indicates how the 'communicative function'view relates to (6). One gets one specific type of communication if individuals use language for it; language is one among a series of instruments for communication. Thus communication is a more global activity of the language user, and language fulfills a role for performing it. This is an answer to the second question mark in (6).
(7) lE^** -> ?] -> [F '",, -> \o,rrnonirorion) Though hardly anybody will dispute that communication is a function of language (at this level of analysis), there is a clear tendency among non-functionalists to dispute the claim that communication is the function of language. They usually refer to all kinds of non-interactive linguistic behavior (among them Chomsky 1975), and/or (more rarely) claim that language is primarily an instrument of thought (e.g. Harman 1975 ). If so, this would mean that the second part of scheme (7) is not complete. This point of view seems inaccurate, but the discussion hinges upon a more precise analysis of communication, and therefore I will postpone it till later (see 5.).
A second set of proposals (including Ogden and Richards 1949 , Jakobson 1960 , Hymes 1962 , Robinson 1972 , Copi 1978 , Dik and Kooij 1919 , Dik 1986 also speech act classifications like Austin 7962 and Searle 1976 belong here8) mainly concerns phenomena which are to be situated at a level of abstraction different from the one represented in (7).
Most of the functions discussed in these proposals concern sub-aspects or instances of the phenomenon of communication, in that they refer to language user can perform by means of specific (sets of with utterance (8) (types of) communicative acts a linguistic utterances. For example, (9) act of expressing an emotion. Hence, one can say that a function of language in general) is to allow the is present in each of the above mentioned proposals (9) Close the damned door! can be used to perform the communicative act of making an appeal to the hearer to perform a further act. Hence, this is another function of language, mentioned e.g. in the proposals by Jakobson, Hymes, Searle, Copi, and Dik. These functions speciff the role of specific (sets of) utterances for the language user, and in terms of a scheme of type (1) they could be conceived as in (10). A general problem with overviews of this type is whether they have overall validity.
It is questionable whether it is possible to make an exhaustive list of sub-functions of communication (contrary to what is often claimed in e.g. speech act theory) since language allows the performance of an endless variety of communicative acts. It is possible to distinguish main categories of sub-functions, which can be further subdivided in principle until one reaches the level of the individual act. In fact, all sub-functions mentioned in the proposals under consideration are wider categories. But then the problem is that there can be considerable variability in categorizing sub-functions (as is apparent from the proposals; and see Searle 7976), depending on the citeria used and the level of abstraction chosen within the phenomenon of communication.
A major difficulty with the proposals is that they hardly ever make explicit which criteria have been used and which level of abstraction has been chosen (Searle is the only exception). Still, though this is by no means always the case (see below), some proposals do show a systematicity in the classification, and such cases clearly demonstrate how there can be an orientation to quite different dimensions of communication. (ln this way proposals sometimes implicitly relate to particular organic functions of language.) For instance, the function specified with respect to (8) above states some referential object of a speech act (which relates it to the fact that language in communication refers to, or provides information about states of affairs in reality, which is an organic functioncf. 4.2). Thus, a classification can be oriented toward types of referential objects of communicative acts.)
The function specified with respect to (9), however, indicates a type of intentionality of a speech act (thus, it relates to the fact that in communication the speaker pursues intentions with language, which is another organic function -4.2).Hence, a classification can also be oriented toward types of intentions involved in communicative acts. No doubt many more criteria for classification can be found. and communicative acts can be classified according to each of these.
It is also questionable whether such classifications have cross-cultural validity (again contrary to what is sometimes suggested). No doubt, there are differences in what can be done with language depending on the cultural background of the speakers. Thus, while the universality of the fact that language is used for communication is beyond doubt, this does not imply that it is possible to give a universal specification of which specific communicative acts can be performed with language (Hymes 1969) .
Speech act classifications like Austin's and Searle's, and also the proposals by Dik and Kooij (1979) (with exception of the 'aesthetic function 'cf. below) and Dik (1986) , are examples of pure surveys of sub-functions of communication which are also explicitly intended as such. Dik and Kooij's (1979: 29ff) typology juxtaposes sub-functions related to different dimensions (they also admit that there are various possibilities to classiff communicative acts), but speech act classifications, and also Dik's (1986) classification, which is closely related to them, tend to consistently orient themselves toward one dimension of communication, viz. intentionality.
Ogden and Richards ' (1949) proposal, which basically distinguishes between two usages of language, viz. to symbolize a referent (the symbolic function), and to denote emotions, attitudes, moods, etc. of the speaker (the emotive function, which is further subdivided, but the details do not matter for the present), can also be considered a 'pure' taxonomy of sub-functions, but one oriented toward the informative dimension of communication.
One has to be careful with the basic distinction they suggest in terms of types of 'referential objects' of communicative acts, however. It relies upon a differentiation benveen the extra-subjective reality and the intra-subjective emotions. But a language user can only provide information about hisiher intra-subjective interpretation of extra-subjective reality.
(cf. 4.1.) Robinson's (1972) proposal, which covers fourteen functions, some of which are further subdivided (and the author himself states that "the scheme is by no means complete, and probably not exhaustive" (ibidem: 49)), appears to be a wild mixture of different phenomena (the indication that "the functions are not all at the same level of analysis"
(ibidem: 49) is an understatement). Many of his functions are sub-functions of communication taken from various dimensions of communication or situated at different levels of abstraction, but some even relate to quite different phenomena (e.9., 'performatives' are in his list, while they obviously are a formal category, not a function). It stands to reason that such a conflation of dimensions and levels is not likelv to enhance our understandins of the functionality of language.
Yet, there is one distinction in his qtrolog/ which leads us to an interesting phenomenon not to be found in other proposals. Among Robinson's functions are 'expression of affect' on the one hand, and 'marking of the emitter for emotional state, personality and identity' on the other. Though they might seem to be akin, these are quite different things. While the former is a sub-function of communication (cf (8) above), the latter is an unavoidable implication of the fact that language use is always performed by a person with an emotional life, a social and cultural background, etc., which are permanently present in his/her behavior. The use of language for expressing affect also provides the hearer with information about the speaker's emotional state etc., and the same is true if language is used for requesting or instructing, or whatever other communicative act. But marking the emitter is not an organic function either: it is not something which serves the speaker in pursuing the goal involved in his/her communicative act, it is not a property language must have in order to be fit for use in communication. Rather, it is a result of system-internal properties of the 'mechanism' producing (linguistic) behavior. Hence, this is not a function of language at all, but a 'side-effect' or 'noise' produced through language behavior (similar in status to the beating sound produced by a heartcf. 2.), and a functional analysis of language will have to take this factor into account, next to the (Jakobson 1960: 21) These determine six functions: the context the referential function, the addresser the emotive function, the addressee the conative function, contact the phatic function, the code the metalinguistic function, and the messagc the poetic function.
The fact that Jakobson (iust like Btihler, whose typology does relate to the level of the organic functions) conceived his function typology from the perspective of constitutive and inalienable factors in communication suggests that what he was looking for is an answer to the remaining question mark in (7) .e Yet, instead of wondering what these ,factors imply for the constitution of utterances a speaker uses for the purpose of communication, he has switched to a completely different level of analysis in formulating his functions. He has started discussing communicative acts in which the user explicitly orients him/herself toward one of these factors (mainly in the sense that the factor becomes a referential object in the act). Consequently, he has formulated sub-functions of communication.
Hence his referential, emotive and conative functions, which at first sight might be taken to correspond to Btihler's three functions (3.2), are conceived in such a way that they perfectly correspond to functions occurring e.g. in the typology by Dik and Kooij (1979) , i.e. functions of the type stated with respect to (8) and (9) above. The same goes 9B for the phatic function, which is akin to the contact function in Dik and Kooij's system.
As an example, Jakobson (1960: 24) cites (11).
(11) Are you listening?
Obviously, (11) only illustrates the fact that contact can be the object of a communicative act. But nothing is said about the potential role of the channel in constituting language use in communication in general. The same is true for the metalinguistic function (which is zrlso to be found in Robinson's typology). Jakobson illustrates that language can be used to perform communicative acts about language. But that is nothing more than stating a sub-function of communication (cf. also Busse 1915).
A similar criticism can be made for the three functions (the informative, expressive and directive) formulated by Copi (1978: 55ft) : the similarity with Bi.ihler's typology indicates that he was aiming at organic functions, yet they turn out to be no different from Jakobson's, Dik and Kooij's, etc. functions.
This confusion of levels of analysis is also illustrated by the fact that Jakobson and
Copi more or less explicitly claim exhaustiveness with respect to their functions, just like Btihler and Halliday. In fact, it must be possible to formulate an exhaustive list of organic functions of language" But since Jakobson and Copi have formulated sub-functions of communication, there is actually no question of exhaustiveness of their typologies.
Though Hymes' (1962) proposal strongly relies on Jakobson's, the above criticism does not hold for him. The only difference with Jakobson is that Hymes replaces the factor 'context' by two factors, 'topic' and 'setting', and correspondingly states two functions instead of one, viz. the referential and the contextual respectively. The basic nature of Hymes' functions is identical to Jakobson's. But the main difference is that Hymes is perfectly aware of their nature. He explicitly presents them as types of communicative acts, and he clearly states that he is not looking for constants (or universals) in communication (unlike what is involved in searching for the organic functions of language) but that as an ethnomethodologist he is interested in the variables in it (cf. also Hymes 1972) . He also explicitly denies exhaustiveness. And his points of dispute with Jakobson, e.g. as to the existence of a one-to-one correlation of factors in communication and functions (Hymes 7962: 720ff), mark the profound difference in attitude toward the function typologies in both scholars.
We still have not considered the poetic function mentioned by Jakobson (and Hymes), which under the name of 'aesthetic function' also occurs in Dik and Kooij's and Robinson's typologies. This is certainly not a sub-function of communication. There is much dispute I about the precise definition of poeticity, but it seems plausible to consider it a question of the way an utterance is conceived, with respect to both content and form. Hence, 'making' poeticity is not a communicative act, it is inherent to a communicative act. It is a characteristic of linguistic behavior; every utterance has poeticity. Still, one cannot say that it is an organic function of language either, for it is not an activity or property of utterances contributing to the achievement of their role in communication. Rather, it is a matter of the way a language user performs his/her communicative act, of the way (s)he uses language to reach hisiher goals. This can depend on conscious choices (poeticity can be actively pursued in verbal behavior), but can be determined unconsciously as well. Thus, poeticity is no doubt closely related to the 'marking of the emitter' discussed above.
Of course, the way an utterance is constituted can be a topic as such for the language user, in language games, abstract (what might be called 'non-informative') literary productions ('l'art pour I'art'), etc. In such cases the language user tries to express the aesthetics of the linguistic medium as such, and one could say that the verbal means become object of communication, just like emotions, weather and politics can be object of communication. Also in more 'realistic' literature this is at least one of the objects of communication. Hence, showing the aesthetics of the linguistic medium is a sub-function of communication. Still, poeticity as such is rather an inherent factor to language use in general, hence
Jakobson is no doubt right in claiming that every utterance has a poetic value. This is the case for a newspap€r article, an advertisement or a political debate no less than for a poem. Although under normal circumstances the degree of poeticity of the latter will be considerably lower than the degree of poeticity of the former (but there are notable ex- (1934: 24) .The production of an utterance is a reaction to the stimulation by an object ('Ding') within the field of perception of 'einer'. Hearing the utterance is for 'der andere' a stimulus to look r00 at the object. This leads Bi.ihler to postulating three functions of language, iz. (i) 'Darstellung': it represents objects and situations; (ii) 'Ausdruck': it depends on the transmitter, and erpresses his/her personality; and (iii) 'Appell': it is an impulse to the receiver, and orients his/her internal or erternal behavior. Halliday (1970b: 147, 7974b : 95) has criticized Bi.ihler's analysis (and function typologies in general) for being much too extrinsic. Such an approach is, according to Halliday, sociologically or psychologically oriented, but cannot throw light on the nature of linguistic structure. As an alternative, he advocates an intrinsic approach in which each systematic contrast in a grammar is assigned to some network of choices which is related to a particular function. He distinguishes three relatively independent networks (cf.
Halliday 1976 The difference between these two is significant psychologically, but linguistically it is very tenuous: is an interrogative, for example, a demand to be given information (conative), or an expression of a desire for knowledge (expressive)? It is not surprising to find that expressive and conative are not really distinct in the language system.
They are combined into a singie 'personal' functionor, as I would prefer to call it, to bring out its social nature, an 'interpersonal' function. (Halliday I976: 27) No doubt, Halliday is right in claiming that it is irrelevant to wonder whether an interrogative is a request for information or an expression of a desire for knowledge, for a question is both. Yet, this is not really the point of Bi.ihler's distinction between Ausdruck and Appell. There is a problem with the distinction, but this has to do with the way Biihler approaches the entire phenomenon of communication.
Biihler clearly takes an 'objective' point of view in analyzing communication. He tries to escape from the perspective of the acting individual, considering language from the point of view of a neutral observer isolated from the actual communicative processes in the language users. This point is also made by Reichling.
The communication process in language is not a mechanically closed and homogeneous continuum [...] . There is only continuity on the level of the physical phenomena.
The language experiences of speaker and hearer develop outside of it and over it.
Precisely insofar as there is 'language' [...J, there is duality; insofar as there is physical cohesion, there is unity. In order for the communication to be complete, the process must be continued consciously on each of the poles, speaker and hearer.
[...] Cnmmunication implies rwo distinct processes, one in the speaker, one in the hearer. In between and apart from these there are undoubtedly sound waves, yet but occur in groups, each one embedded in a verbal context. Yet, this is a matter of the formal appearance of language: the text is nothing but one aspect of the syntax of language, and it is in this format that language fulfills its functions for the user. Hence, as Halliday himself puts it, the textual dimension is instrumental for the other functions, in the same way as language in general can be said to be instrumental for its functions.
Halliday is also right in claiming that the textual embedding of an utterance has an effect on the organization of an utterance. But this is not different from the fact that the sentential embedding of a constituent has effect on the organization of that constituent.rr Criticism on Halliday's functions (as well as on his one-to-one approach to formal system and function) is also to be found in Van der Geest (1975) , yet the alternatives he advocates are not without problems either. He replaces the interpersonal function by an intentional function, which represents only the speaker's interests in communication. In the light of the discussion above, this is partly appropriate. Yet Van der Geest does not introduce the required second function relating to the fact that there is also a hearer involved in communication.
He also accepts a textual function, yet it is defined so vaguely that appropriate comments are hard to give. It says that an utterance is somehow related to context and situation. ln as far as this covers the same type of phenomena as Halliday's function, the criticism given above remains valid. In as far as it also refers to the fact that an utterance relates to the entire communicative situation in which it is used, this is begging the question what this relationship involves, and what the functionality of language involves in this respect. But it is not a formulation of a function of language.
Finally, Van der Geest splits up Halliday's ideational function into a referential function (an utterance refers to a state of affairs) and an attitudinal function (it provides information about the speaker's interpretation of the state of affairs referred to). This is questionable, however. If this is intended to mean that an utterance refers to the extrasubjective world and to the intra-subjective interpretation of it, Van der Geest is introducing an irrelevant and even dangerous distinction. A language user can only refer to his/her intra-subjective interpretation of reality, since that is the only thing (s)he knows (cf.
4.1). Of course, somehow language must also refer to the extra-subjective reality, since the intra-subjective interpretation is based on it. But that does not concern the matter of the functionality of language for its user. Alternatively, if Van der Geest is distinguishing between the fact that language can refer to (the speaker's interpretation of) reality and to the speaker's attitudes toward (his interpretation oQ reality, he has returned to a distinction between sub-functions of communication of the type made by Ogden and Richards (1949) . At the level of the organic functions, the only thing that matters is that language provides information about things (reality, attitudes, and no matter what else).
TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF I-A.NGUAGE FUNCTIONS

COMMUNICATION AND HOW TO ANALYZE TT
The balance of our discussion of the literature is rather meager. We have only found a clear indication that the (or at least a) role function of language is communication.
(7) fE^nn -> ?] -> [E.r., -> 4""" '*.a]
The determination of the organic functions of language in communication remains a problem, however. Though the literature. has provided some partial answers (the observation that language refers, that it serves the speaker's purposes, but also has to relate to the hearer's perspective), no clear-cut typology has emerged. Irt's therefore try to provide a more systematic answer.
An obvious starting point is an analysis of the phenomenon of communication as such (i.e. the way which was also followed by Biihler and Jakobson In order to avoid the types of problems noted with respect to the analyses discussed in the previous sections, some basic remarks on the nature of communication and its implications for the further discussion are in order. [rt's take Franck's (1980) Human perception seems to be more than a passive experiencing of stimuli from the outside world. Information is processed at different levels, from the purely physical till the conceptual, and processing implies manipulating the information depending on the codes '1,, 1980a, 1980b) . These principles were intended to account for child development, but they seem applicable at the level of concept acquisition in adults as well (although other characteristics of the acquisition process may be quite different).
An impressive amount of examples illustrating the information distorting nature of perception can be found in Watzlawick (1976) . He concludes that the notions of 'order' and 'chaos' do not have an objective content, contrary to the general opinion, butlike so many things in lifederive their meaning from the point of view of the observer. (Watzlawick 1976: 62 my translation)
In Wittgenstein's words:
Ich bin meine Welt
Alles was wir sehen, konnte auch anders sein.
Alles was wir tiberhaupt beschreiben konnen, konnte auch anders sein. Another element of the perspective to be taken in analyzing communication which deserves some attention concerns the exact status of the elements 'speaker' and 'hearer', and 'producing' and 'understanding'. In certain branches of the pragmatic literature one frequently finds a tendency to take an exclusively interpretive perspective on communication, often on principled grounds, i.e. to analyze communication only from the perspective of understanding linguistic acts. In terms of hypotheses, this mostly results in a one-sided concern with hearer performance, and a total disregard for speaker This matter should not be confused with the question as to the status of and relationship between productive and interpretive performance in linguistic behavior, however.
Es gibt keine
Both 'modes' have elements of understanding and creation in the sense just mentioned, being guided by similar subjective positions in the communication. As far as the relation between these modes in communication is concerned, Parret's suggestion that interpretation (the perspective of the hearer) has priority over production (the perspective of the speaker) is simply mistaken, for, trivially, the acts constituting communicative behavior are made by the speaker, not by the hearer. If nothing has been produced, there is nothing to be understood. The speaker perspective always dominates the hearer perspective in the s€nse that the latter necessarily undergoes the act by the former. (Of course, this does not say anything at all about the relationship between the interaction partners, each of which is both speaker and hearer, constantly changing roles in communication.) If one really wants to use these terms, then there is an 'asymmetric priority'
of production over interpretation. And this is reflected in the fact that an analysis of the functionality of linguistic behavior will automatically take a productive orientation, i.e. the perspective of the one constituting the act, not the one receiving the act (as is clearly demonstrated in the discussion of proposals in foregoing sections). Interpreting an act is (at least in first instance) reconstructing in which way it is functional for the one performing it.
Of course, this has nothing to do with the question whether in analyzing language performance in communication one should pay more attention to the processes of production or interpretation. Both are indispensable aspects of communicative behavior, and each normal language user possesses both capacities. Hence, it is inappropriate to claim that "L is a language of a community only in case the members of this community understand the discursive sequence of L" (Parret 1986: 756) (see also Parret 1982), as it would be inappropriate to claim this with respect to the production of L. L is the language of a community only if its members can produce and understand L./e I r09 4J. BASIC FAC:TORS AND ORGANIC FI.JNCTIONS
The question we ought to answer is then: what are the elements in a communicative situation playing a role if a language user constitutes an utterance to perform some communicative act? I-et's start from the most simple, prototypical structure of communication, in which two speakers/hearers (S/Hs) act toward each other in a dyadic exchange, and consider more complex or deviant interaction patterns later.
In order for a communicative act to occur, one SAI must have an intention with respect to the other, concerning an aspect of his/trer interpretation of reality (henceforth the 'statc of affairs ', SoA) which is somehow relevant in the actual situation (i.e. to both S/Hs).Relevance must be taken broadly: S/H can be eager to learn more about the Sod (s)he can want to tell something about the SoA (s)he can want to change the SoA (s)he can want to respond to a desire concerning the SoA from the side of the other S/FI, etc. A communicative exchange is initiated through an act according to this scheme by one of the S/FIs; it is settled if the SoA is recognized as relevant and the conditions of the situation as acceptable by the other S/H; and it lass as long as it remains relevant and acceptable for both S/FIs (of course, the pattern can be continued by switching to a new SoA relevant to both S/FIs). Each individual act in this situation is performed according to the actual S/H's interpretation of the situation.
This mcans that an S/H has to take into consideration at least the following factors in deciding how to act.
(i) The frame of reference S/H has to be concerned with the relevant SoA occurring in his/her interpreted reality. Thc notion of interpreted reality' -"y be somewhat misleading, for an SoA can involve cverything that can be thought of, including knowledge of the outside world, but also cmotions, attitudes, abstract or fictive states and events, etc., i.e. things which have never bcen cxperienced in the outside world (cf. also Dik 1982) . kt's call this entire domain of refcrential objects in SAIs knowledge the 'universe of interpretation' (Uf.
Deciding on whether and how to explicate an SoA to another SAI (henceforth FIiS) is not a simple matter (cf. Grice's (7975,1989) Communication is based on the fact that an individual is a social being related to and dependent on others, also with respect to the intentional act being performed. A communicative situation automatically creates a specific social and interpersonal reality which offers possibilities but at the same time creates restrictions and obligations ll1 concerning possible roles and related behavioral patterns for the interaction partners.
These are due partly to general socio-culturally rooted conventions concerning role patterns in society, and partly to the strictly intersubjective relationship holding between the interaction partners. This involves a complex and often very subtle interplay of rules concerning matters such as politeness and deferenc€, power (natural or institutionalized), solidarity, prestige,'face ', etc. (cf. e.g. Argyle 1973 , Brown and kvinson 1979 , l-akoff and Tannen 1979 .
Obviously, SAI has to evaluate his/her relationship with HA in order to decide whether to perform an act, and if (s)he does (s)he has to comply with the rules as they apply to this relationship, in general and in the specific situation (unless (s)he wants to break them, of course The three factors mentioned so far correspond to the three components of the communicative situation indicated in Btihler's 'Organon Modell'. As noted in 3.1, Jakobson and
Hymes have suggested some further components to be taken into account, and at least one of them does have to be considered a relevant factor for the speaker's decision what to do and how to do it.
(iv) The setting
Communicative interaction is always spatially and temporally embedded in some physically, culturally and socially specified situation, and it is influenced by the characteristics of this situation or setting. This is not to be taken in the sense that this situation can be the frame of reference for S/H. Jakobson's factor of 'context' is characterized this way, and as such (S/FI's subjective interpretation of) it is nothing more than a potentially relevant SoA to which S/FI's acts can refer. Hymes' distinction between 'topic'and 'setting' seems to introduce an appropriate differentiation in the status of the situation. The former concerns the situation as part of the frame of reference for SAI, like Jakobson's 'context', but The 'channel', which Jakobson mentions as a separate factor, can actually be considered a special sub-element of the setting, for it co-determines the nature of the setting.
Thus, the channel can partly determine or limit the possible means for communication, or can rule out certain aspects of the medium. 8.g., telephone excludes the use of nonverbal, gestural and visual behavior. Written communication also excludes intonation.
Moreover, the channel co-determines the physical and cultural setting of SAI and FI,tS.
In case of telephone conversation it is temporally identical but spatially different. In written communication it is both temporally and spatially different. (Cf. Schegloff 1979 , Settekorn 1981 , Ostman 1987 , De Rycker 1987 Evidently, these elements co-determine whether and how S/H will perform some act.
As with the factors mentioned before, S/H also has to take into account his/her hypotheses concerning the way H,rS evaluates the different aspects of the setting. Does FI,tS have respect for a church? Does FIIS feel obliged by the institutional setting, and to what degree? What is the setting in which the person at the other end of the telephone linc is speaking?
The two remaining factors in Jakobson's typology, 'message' and 'code', are not relevant for determining the functions of language. Concerning the former, I can basically refer back to the discussion of the poetic and textual functions in 3. It is precisely for linguistic behavior (the message) that we are trylng to find out which factors determine its occurrence, hence this element is neutral in our consideration (as is accurately suggested in Btihler's discussion).
Exactly the same remark can be made for the code. The code is inherent to the medium of communication, in that it exhaustively determines its structural character. Morse code, e.g., is characterized by a certain syntax, just like language, and more specifically all FIiSs to be an entity (a group), which means that the dyadic pattern remains basically thc same; or (s)he differentiates between the different HlSs present, and then at least some of the factors in the basic interaction pattern discussed above are multiplicated with the number of FI6s. It can be necessary to determine intentions toward each HiS (unless they are identical for all of them), and to take into account the probable intentions of each of them. SAI has to take into consideration potential differences between his/her and each FI/S's interpretation of reality (the relevant SoA). (S)he has to take into consideration his/her social and interpersonal relationship with each HiS, as well as his/her hypothesis about cach FI/S's conception of it. And under circumstances it can be necessary to take into account differences in the setting of each FI,6 (cf. a triadic telephone conversation).
Finally, SAI may have to take into consideration this entire pattern as it exists between thc different FI6s. (Cf. e.g. Clark and C-arlson (1982) on the role of mutual knowledge of nvo FI6s.) Yeg all of this is not simply a matter of multiplication of interaction patterns, for the different patterns will no doubt interfere in S/FI's behavior. (Often an S/FI will communicate differently with an HA depending on whether they are alone or whether there are other H/Ss present.) Anyway, the same basic factors remain valid, only their realization is much more complicated.
Second, there are types of communication in which the direction of the action is more or less one-sided. This is the case e.g. in speeches, in which there does remain a minimal fonn of direct reaction in terms of the general attitude of the public, and of questions or remarks from individuals in the public. In radio and television broadcasts, as in other LL4 forms of mass media communication, in which the channel imposes one-directionality, the manifest reaction from the HAs is as good as non-existent. Of course, there is a reaction in the hearer or reader, but the speaker cannot observe it (except afterwards, in calls to the studio or letters to the editor, e.g.). Yet, in these cases it does remain necessary for S/FI to make clear the SoA (s)he has in mind, also on the basis of his/her hypothesis about what the average HA might know about it; (s)he has to follow his/her intentions in acting, probably also pre-conceiving possible intentions from the HlSs (it does not make sense to announce a radio game to which listeners can respond by calling the studio, if one can be sure that nobody is going to respond); (s)he obviously has to respect the norms inherent to the role-relationship with the average listener/reader; and mass-media involve a specific type of setting (also determined by the channels they use), which again has to be taken into account.
Non-active but 'participating' H/Ss present in the communicative situation next to active H/Ss might receive more or less the same status as the public of a speech (of course, there can be different degrees of involvement of HAs in the conversationcf.
Clark 1987). SAI can develop an interaction scheme for them, next to the interaction scheme for the active H/S(s), yet according to the same principles as in one-directional communication. Purely accidental HlSs, which have nothing to do with the conversation, might also influence the communication, yet rather as part of the factor 'setting'. Again, the basic factors all appear to remain intact. There are only differences in how they are realized.
We may therefore conclude that these four factors are always valid for all types of communicative situations. Communicative success depends on the way in which SAI manages to maneuver within the possibilities they offer and restrictions they impose, in deciding what to do and how to do it. Moreover, they are always equally important, although various phenomena might seem to contradict this.
The fact that for an S/FI communicative success means realizing his/her intentions might be taken as a suggestion that intention is the most important factor. In fact, there are many meaning theories which nearly exclusively focus on the notion of intention. This is mistaken, however. Intention may be the causing or 'driving' factor of communication, but an intention never stands alone. It always has an object (some SoA), and it is always oriented toward an H/S within some environment. Hence, realizing intentions in the first place crucially depends on how S/FI manages to make clear what his/her intentions are all about. The frame of reference could be called the 'grounding' factor of communication.
And realizing intentions also crucially depends on H/S's willingness and ability to comply with them, hence S/H absolutely has to take into account his/her interpersonal and social I rl5 obligations and the conventions inherent in the setting. Failing to do so would not only lead to a communicative breakdown, but could also result in sanctions from FIIS. The social relationship and the setting can be called 'restricting' factors of communication.
Hence, though the four factors may be assigned a different 'role' in communication, they certainly do not differ in importance.
Though it is certainly appropriate to react against predominantly intention-oriented meaning theories like speech act theory, one should also be careful with a number of attempts, especially from an ethnolinguistic perspective, to go the other direction and reduce the role of intention in communication. Duranti (1988) argues that in Samoan culture the effect of communicative acts is often much more important to the community than the intention of the acting person (see also Du Bois 7987).21 This does not change the fact that communicative (or whatever other) acts involve an intention on the part of the actor, however. As Searle puts it:
[t is a mistake] to suppose there is some close connection, perhaps even identity, between intention and responsibility. [...We] hold people responsible for many things they do not intend and we do not hold them responsible for many things they do
intend. An example of the former type is the driver who recklessly runs over a child.
He did not intend to run over the child but he is held responsible. And an example of the latter is the man who is forced at gunpoint to sign a contract. He intended to sign the contract but is not held responsible. (Searle 1983: 103) It is beyond doubt that cultural and social circumstances influence intentions of language users, and the ways they try to realize them. If one knows that in the community one is part of one will be held responsible for the effects of one's acts irrespective of the intentions, this will obviously influence one's intentions, and will cause greater caution in deciding on whether and how to pursue them. But intention does remain an indispensable concept in explaining behavior even in the Samoan cases Duranti discusses.
Du Bois (1987) argues that there are even cases of language use in which intention does not play a role at all. He specifically refers to different types of ritual speech, such as the 'sixteen cowrie divination' of the Yoruba or symbol-spinning among the Sisala. But, again, his analysis does not distinguish between intention and responsibility, or in this case more generally 'personality'. In any case, there is intention behind the utterances spoken by the medium of an oracle at least in three respects. First the diviner must have the intention to respect the oracle and speak the phrases which correspond to what the oracle 'says' (e.g. the number of cowrie shells facing mouth up). Second, the phrases spoken by the diviner have been coined sometime in the past by some person who has had an intention with them, probably even directly concerning the divinatory process. Thirdly, the fact that in many of the societies having divination the utterances triggered by an oracle are not taken to be produced by a person, not even some abstract deity, still does not mean that the utterances are not perceived by the consulter as having an intentionality.
They do have to be perceived as such, for otherwise the consulter of the oracle would not act accordingly. As such, the communication process between the consulter and the oracle/diviner cannot be understood without the element intention as an inherent factor.
(A detailed discussion in Nuyts i.p.)
In judging the importance of the different factors in communication, one should also not be misled by the impression that sometimes certain factors become predominant over others, due to the situational circumstances. This involves different types of cases.
One type occurs if one of the central factors in communication becomes the topic of the conversation. This may seem trivial, but it is precisely in this respect that e.g. Jakobson
and Copi have been misled in formulating their function typologies. One might for instance get the impression that in an examination in school the frame of reference is the main factor in communication. This is appropriate only in the sense that communication is centered around the topic of having knowledge of reality. Quite a different type of interaction in which one factor seems to acquire a predominant position over the others is 'phatic communion ' (Malinowski 1923) or 'smalltalk'. In such situations, it seems that "It is not what is said that matters so much, as that something is said" (Sapir 1933: 16) , and one might be inclined to think that the 'social relationship'is dominant here. Again, this is only partly accurate. Small-talk occurs in situations in which individuals who know each other are together without there being an immediate purpose for it. Often this creates a psychological need and/or social pressure to establish or maintain contact because silence can be felt to be hostile. The purpose is to show that the individuals present remain on good tenns (small-talk is unlikely to occur between individuals who are hostile toward each other). Whether small-talk will occur is strongly determined by factors like personality (pcople strongly differ in 'talkativeness': some never say a word unless they really have to, others never stop talking) and culture (silence certainly does not mean the same everywhere: cf. Basso (7972) and several contributions in Tannen and Saville-Troike (eds., 1985) ). Nevertheless, it is true that it is mainly a psycho-social phenomenon.
But this does not change the fact that all factors mentioned above exert their specific inlluence on the communicative decisions taken by the interlocutors. What we have here is a type of more or less conventionalized setting, the nature of which determines the specific values of the other factors. Only a limited number of SoAs can be topic of the communication (the weather, memories, etc., in any case SoAs which are more or less certain to cause mutual agreement, or at least do not to hold the danger of invoking dispute or conflict between the interaction partners). The intention is to stay in contact and show a positive attitude. And the social or interpersonal pattern is one of communicative equality, while respecting the norms related to the general societal status of each individual.
In summary, it seems that the four factors presented above are universal determinants of communication, although the discussion has shown that there can be rather complex interactions between them. Human thinking and acting is not a flat one-level phenomenon, but is multidimensional and hierarchical. There are constantly things in an individual's interpreted world which attract his/her attention and keep him/her mentally busy. Since they are in the focus of his/her attention, they motivate actions. Actions have to conform to the series of conditioning factors noted above. Obviously, the things which keep an individual busy will influence the values of the conditioning factors, and it appears that this can happen in quite different ways.
Anyway, the above allows us to answer the remaining question in (7). If language has the role function to allow its user to communicate, it has to fulfil the following organic functions:
(i) A" informative function: language allows its user to make explicit the SoA relevant in the communicative situation.22
(ii) An intentional function: language allows its user to pursue his/her intentions with the relevant SoA (iii) A socializing function: language allows its user to conform to the rules and nonns existing with respect to the interpersonal and social relationship with the interaction partner.
(iu) A contextualizing function: language allows its user to adapt to the specific characteristics of the setting in which the interaction occurs.
Thus we can complete scheme (7) as follows:
(12) lE^*n', "ffffi ) \**, \ Chomsky (1975: 53tr) claims that this type of language use, which according to him is at least as frequent as interpersonal language use, cannot be called communicative since it has a decisively different structure. He reproaches Searle (1969, 1972) for nevertheless including these usages under communication, "since the notion 'communication' is now deprived of its essential and interesting character" (Chomsky 1975: 57 ). Yet, upon closer examination the differences between this'individualistic'language use and real communicative language use do not appear to be all that fundamental. Though they receivc values specific for the particular characteristics of the situation, the same basic factors can be pointed out as determinants for SAI's decisions in forming the linguistic acts (cf. also Firth 1952) .
Obviousty, the factor of the personality is as relevant in this type of behavior as it is in any other (if alone in detcrmining how much, and on which occasions, 'individualistic' language use will occur).
As to the functional factors, individualistic language use always concerns some SoA Finally, the sctting has its influencc as well. Talk-to-self is quite different at homc in thc kitchen and in thc bus to work. And cursing onesclf for having made a mistake will sound differently in thc office amidst colleagues at work and at night in bed.
Actually, individualistic language use does not necessarily have to be purely reflexive.
Individuals vcry often privately simulate discourse with others. In that case, S/FI can imagine a fictive alter cgo, or even an existing person, and start talking as if (s)he were involvcd in a real conversation with him/her. E,.9., if (s)he is about to make some important choice, SAI can set up a fictive antagonist holding a different opinion than the onc (s)hc is inclined to hol4 and start a dialectic communication process discussing the pros and cons with this antagonist. And onc will be talking to an 'imagined real' person or'posiblc' person if one is re-doing a conversation one had before with somcone else, or if one is preparing a spcech or talk or anticipating a conversation to be held with another person in the future. Especially in the latter cases, the different factors discussed will all have the same type of impact on the linguistic acts by the speaker as in real conversation, although the fact that the 'addressee'is not really present obviously gives the spcaker much more freedom.
In short, the differences between individualistic and communicative language usc do not appear to bc fundamental at all, as far as the basic principles of the process are conccrncd. Hcncc it can only be a matter of terminologr if one wants to criticize Searle's use of the term 'communication' to refer to both 'types' of linguistic behavior. [n any case, the four organic functions which language fulfills in communication remain valid for this 'deviant' use of language as well. They seem to be good candidates for the status of 'universals of language use' or 'pragmatic universals'.
The above discussion also shows that there is nothing wrong with the claim that language is an instrument for thought, but that it is rather strange that this claim is considered to be in conflict with the claim that language is an instrument for commu- This usage occasionally also occurs in biology and the human sciences (cf. Greenberg 1958 , Nagel 1961 . Moreover, its structure is clearly related to the main usage of the term in the latter sciences to be discussed below. The mathematical usage involves a mainly quantitative dependency relationship between sets of units, which is made explicit by a functional rule. The usage typical of biology and the human sciences also expresses a dependency relationship between entities, but one which cannot be stated in purely quantificational terms, and therefore cannot be formulated in a simple functional rule. (Cf. Nuyts 1988.) Note that the actual manner of formulating these functions can greatly differ, probably depending on the specific constellation of the phenomenon referred to. In most cases, part of scheme (1) is left implicit. E.g., in (2) only A, and A, are mentioned, in (3) E, is not mentioned. This is related to what Greenberg (1958) has called 'activity function', but the present notion is wider than Greenberg's. Though Nagel (1979) is only referring to biological functions, his expositions may be generalized to functions in the human sciences in many respects.
By combining these variants, and organic and role functions, it is possible to represent a system as a functional chain or network making explicit its functional organization. The culminating point of the network is always the cluster [organism/system -> survivaVfunctioning].
Thus, one can have a chain of goals, ultimately ending at the maintenance of the individual, although the distance from the actual linguistic act to this ultimate goal can be very long. In any case, one should not believe that goal-directedness is a simple or inarticulate mattercf.. 3.2.
Though speech acts are not normally called 'functions', their relationship with them is apparent if one considers Searle's (7976: 1) initial question, viz. "How many ways of using language are there?" They concern things an individual can do with language.
Of course, Jakobson distinguishes more factors in the communicative situation than Bi,ihler. On the relevance of these additional factors for the organic functions, see 3.2.
L2/+ t0 Halliday (197aa) has tried to show that the theory of 'functional sentence perspective'
(FSP) of the Prague school starts from the same set of functions. In fact, FSP distinguishes three 'strata' in the linguistic system, viz. those of the grammatical structure of the sentence, the semantic structure of the sentence, and the organization of the utterance (Danes 1964, and several contributions in Danes 1974 ). Yet, FSP itself has never related these strata to functions, and the correspondence might not be as evident as Halliday would like it to be. Within the Prague school, there does not appear to be one generally accepted view on the functionality of language. Btihler's typology appears to have been very influential (Hor6lek L964, Vachek 1966) , but there are also many diverging views. (Cf. Hor6lek 1964 for a short overview.) Most of them are difficult to access for linguistic reasons, but Hor6lek's (1964) exposition remains purely programmatic and impressionistic, and focusses exclusively on sub-functions of the poetic function. It is not unlikely that Hor6lek's (1964: 45) conclusion typifies the situation in the Prague school in general: "Il r6sulte sans doute assez clairement de cet expos€, QU'une th6orie syst€matique des fonctions de la langue dewa encore €tre faite."
It This brings Btihler close to a strong (but biassing) tradition (which persists even today in many semantic theories) to consider reference the most important or even only basic 'activity' of language. Cf. e.g. Dempe (1930) .
12 Busse (1975) provides a survey of other criticisms (often in the same vein) on Btihler's q1polos/.
t3 The core of the problem with Halliday's discussion of functions is precisely the extremely intrinsic approach he advocates. His focus on the linguistic system as such has no doubt distracted his attention from the real question, viz. what language does in communication. And it has led him into a much too simplistic view on the formfunction correlation. See Nuyts (1988) .
14 Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 226ft) are right in stressing that one should not exaggerate subjectivism: there still exists a relationship between reality and knowledge, even though its exact shape is not and most probably cannot be known.
15 This is not to say that reality does not change. I subscribe to Toulmin's (1972) stressing the fundamental historicity and variability of all existing things (human and non-human). Yet, in iself this is a principle valid for all humans, too, and the elements of the changes are identical for all environments. There is always a certain degree of variability and a certain degree of identity, in whatever you consider.
t6 Of course, the more and the larger the differences, the greater the need for com' munication, but also the harder it becomes. This is basically the problem of social stratification, of intercultural and international communication. etc. I t7
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Of course, this characterization has to be interpreted broadly. Orders, e.9., can also be seen as a matter of consensus over an interpretation of reality. Depending on the social relationship between the interaction partners, the one receiving the order will only perform according to it if he agrees with the sender about the appropriateness of the intended change in reality. Even in case the social situation does not allow a refusal to obey an order, e.g. in a military context" communication is a matter of consensus: the one receiving the order is supposed to accept that the view of reality of the one in command is appropriate, and to accept it unconditionally.
This seems to me to be one of the main elements of difference and continuity at the same time, between Wittgenstein (1922) and . Wittgenstein (1922) has been trying to anallze language as a mirror of reality. But which reality? His conclusion that "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, dariiber mu8 man schweigen" (ibidem: 7) seems to signal that he has become aware of the fact that it makes no sense to try and relate language to an objective world: we cannot talk about this world because we cannot know it. "Meine Siitze erlZiutern dadurch, daB sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt wenn er durch sieauf ihneniiber sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er mu8 sozusagen die lriter wegvrerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.) Er muB diese Sdtze tiberwinden, dann sieht er die Welt richtig." (ibidem: 6.54) Consequently, Wittgenstein (1958) consistently starts from a subjectivist (but not a solipsist!) perspective in analyzing language. He has thrown his ladder away.
Thus, a complete model of the linguistic capacity of language users must grasp both dimensions, in equal righs. And though it is partially right (but incomplete) to claim that "the production of discourse should be seen as a procedure of understanding" (Panet 1986: 756), it is mistaken to claim "that the concept of discourse production should be shaped on the basis of the model of the concept of understanding" (ibidem), just like the opposite claim would be mistaken.
This implies that at least the often heard criticism on Gricean meaning theory that it involves an endless embedding of intentions within intentions, is inappropriate, for this perfectly corresponds to the factual nature of intentionality.
Actually, this is often true in Western culture as well. An employee can be fired because of a mistake, even though he did not commit it intentionally. A minister can be forced to resign because of mistakes made by his administration, without his intentions having any influence on this.
I prefer to use the term 'informational function'rather than the more often used term 'referential function' because the latter is much too reminiscent of reference to the extra-subjective reality. As discussed above, language always refers to the subject's interpretation of reality in the widest sense of the word (this is true even for delgtic ele ments).
;r Note that the characterizations of style and of poeticity (ct. 2.2) show a very clear resemblance. Both are matters having to do with or resulting from the way linguistic means are used to achieve goals. This corresponds perfectly to the intuition that both phenomena are closely related, and to the practice in poetics to handle them in a mutual relationship.
